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Abstract
We present Charlotte, a framework for composable, authenticated distributed data
structures. Charlotte data is stored in blocks that reference each other by hash. To-
gether, all Charlotte blocks form a directed acyclic graph, the blockweb; all observers
and applications use subgraphs of the blockweb for their own data structures. Unlike
prior systems, Charlotte data structures are composable: applications and data struc-
tures can operate fully independently when possible, and share blocks when desired.
To support this composability, we define a language-independent format for Charlotte
blocks and a network API for Charlotte servers.
An authenticated distributed data structure guarantees that data is immutable and
self-authenticating: data referenced will be unchanged when it is retrieved. Char-
lotte extends these guarantees by allowing applications to plug in their own mech-
anisms for ensuring availability and integrity of data structures. Unlike most tradi-
tional distributed systems, including distributed databases, blockchains, and distributed
hash tables, Charlotte supports heterogeneous trust: different observers may have their
own beliefs about who might fail, and how. Despite heterogeneity of trust, Charlotte
presents each observer with a consistent, available view of data.
We demonstrate the flexibility of Charlotte by implementing a variety of integrity
mechanisms, including consensus and proof of work. We study the power of disentan-
gling availability and integrity mechanisms by building a variety of applications. The
results from these examples suggest that developers can use Charlotte to build flexible,
fast, composable applications with strong guarantees.
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Figure 1: Blocks are represented
as rectangles. References from one
block to another are shown as cir-
cles. The pale blue blocks form a
tree, whereas the darker red blocks
form a chain. The rightmost red
block references a blue block, so to-
gether the union of the red and blue
blocks forms a larger tree. The black
block also references a red block.
1 Introduction
A variety of distributed systems obtain data integrity assurance by building distributed
data structures in which data blocks are referenced using collision-resistant hashes [54],
allowing easy verification that the correct data has been retrieved via a reference. We
call these Authenticated Distributed Data Structures (ADDSs). A particularly inter-
esting example of an ADDS is a blockchain, but there are other examples, such as
distributed hash tables as in CFS [14], distributed version control systems like Git [68],
and file distribution systems like BitTorrent [12]. However, an ADDS does not au-
tomatically possess all properties needed by blockchains and other applications. An
ADDS might fail to ensure availability, because a reference to data does not guarantee
it can be retrieved. It might even fail to ensure integrity, because an ADDS might be
extended in inconsistent, contradictory ways—for example, multiple new blocks could
claim to be the 7th in some blockchain.
Therefore, an ADDS commonly incorporates additional mechanisms to ensure avail-
ability and integrity in the presence of malicious adversaries. Some systems rely on
gossip and incentive schemes to ensure availability, and consensus or proof-of-work
schemes to ensure integrity. Blockchains like Bitcoin [51] and Ethereum [19] lose
integrity if the adversary controls a majority of the hash power, while Chord loses
availability if an adversary controls enough consecutive nodes [67].
Importantly, all past ADDS systems lack composability: an application cannot
use multiple ADDSs in a uniform way and obtain a composition of their guarantees.
ADDSs from different systems cannot intersect (share blocks) or even reference each
other. Lack of composability makes it difficult for applications to atomically commit
information to multiple ADDSs. For instance, if blockchain ADDSs were composable,
we could atomically commit a single block to two cryptocurrency blockchains, instead
of requiring trusted clearinghouses.
A core reason for this lack of composability is that each system has its own set
of failure assumptions. A user of Bitcoin or Ethereum, for example, must assume
that at least half the hashpower is honest.1 There is no mechanism for observers or
applications to choose their own assumptions.
We address these limitations with Charlotte, a decentralized framework for com-
posable ADDS with well-defined availability and integrity properties. Together, these
ADDSs form the blockweb, an authenticated directed acyclic graph (DAG) [45] of all
Charlotte data, which is divided into blocks that reference each other by hash. Charlotte
1 There is some evidence that users need even stronger assumptions [18].
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distills ADDSs down to their essentials, allowing it to serve as a common framework
for building a wide variety of ADDSs in a composable manner, as illustrated by Fig-
ure 1.
Within the blockweb, different applications can construct any acyclic data struc-
ture from blocks, including chains, trees, polytrees, multitrees, and skiplists. Whereas
blockchains enforce a total ordering on all data, the blockweb requires ordering only
when one block references another. Unnecessary ordering is an enormous drain on
performance; indeed, it arguably consumes almost all of traditional blockchains’ re-
sources. Charlotte applications can create an ordering on blocks, but blocks are by
default only partially ordered.
In Charlotte, each server stores whichever blocks it wishes. Most servers will want
blocks relevant to applications they’re running, but some may provide storage or order-
ing as a service for sufficiently trusting clients.
Charlotte users can set their own (application-specific) failure assumptions. The
failure assumptions of a user effectively filter the blockweb down to blocks forming an
ADDS that remains available and consistent under all tolerable failures and adversarial
attacks. An observer whose failure assumptions are correct can, given the assumptions
of a different correct observer, calculate the subgraph of the blockweb they share.
A key novelty of Charlotte is its generality; it is not application-specific. Unlike
other systems that build DAGs of blocks, Charlotte does not implement a cryptocur-
rency [53, 42, 57, 63, 64], require a universal “smart contract” language for all appli-
cations [27, 69, 34], have any distinguished “main chain” [52, 71], or try to enforce the
same integrity requirements across all ADDSs in the system [37, 44, 72, 15, 7].
Instead, Charlotte distills ADDSs down their essentials, allowing it to serve as a
more general ADDS framework, in which each application can construct an ADDS
based on its own trust assumptions and guarantees, yet all of these heterogeneous
ADDSs are part of the same blockweb. Indeed, existing block-DAG systems can be
recreated within Charlotte, gaining a degree of composability. We have implemented
example applications to demonstrate that Charlotte is flexible enough to simultane-
ously support a variety of applications, including Git-like distributed version control,
timestamping, and blockchains based variously on agreement, consensus, and proof-of-
work. The shared framework even supports adding shared blocks on multiple chains.
Contributions
• Our mathematical model for ADDSs (§3) gives a general way to characterize
ADDSs with diverse properties in terms of observers, a novel characterization
of different failure tolerances for different participants, and a general way to
compose ADDSs and their properties.
• Charlotte provides an extensible type system for blocks, and a standard API for
communicating them (§4).
• Example applications show the benefits of using the Charlotte model (§5).
• We generalize blockchains in the Charlotte model, including a technique for
separating availability and integrity duties onto separate services and a general
model of linearizable transactions on distributed objects (§6).
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• We have implemented a prototype of Charlotte along with proof-of-concept im-
plementations of various applications that demonstrate its expressiveness and
ability to compose ADDSs (§7).
• Performance measurements show that Charlotte’s performance overheads are
reasonable (§8).
• Analysis of real usage data shows that Charlotte’s added concurrency offers a
large speed advantage over traditional blockchain techniques (§6.5).
2 Overview
2.1 Blocks
In Charlotte, blocks are the smallest unit of data, so clients don’t fetch “block headers,”
or other partial blocks [19]. Therefore, Charlotte applications ideally use small blocks.
For instance, to build something like Ethereum in Charlotte, it would be sensible to
create the Merkle tree [48] structure found within each Ethereum block out of many
small Charlotte blocks. This makes it easier to divide up storage duties and to fetch
and reference specific data.
2.2 Attestations
Some blocks are attestations: they prove that an ADDS satisfies properties beyond
those inherent to a DAG of immutable blocks. For instance, if a server signs an attes-
tation stating that it will store and make available a specific block, it means the block
will be available as long as that server functions correctly. Such an attestation functions
as a kind of proof premised on the trustworthiness of the signing server. Attestations
about the same blocks naturally compose: all properties of all attestations hold when
all conditions are met.
All attestation types are pluggable: Charlotte servers can define their own subtypes,
which prove nothing to observers who do not understand them. Charlotte is extremely
flexible: application-defined attestation types can represent different consensus mech-
anisms (from Paxos to Nakamoto), different ADDS types, and different availability
strategies. Although attestations can express a wide variety of properties about an
ADDS, we divide them into two subtypes: availability attestations and integrity attes-
tations.
2.3 Availability Attestations
Availability attestations prove that blocks will be available under certain conditions.
One example of an availability attestation would be a signed statement from a server
promising that a given block will be available as long as the signing server is function-
ing correctly. We call servers that issue availability attestations Wilbur servers.2 At-
testations may make more complex promises. For example, proofs of retrievability [6]
might be used as availability attestations. Availability attestations are not limited to
promises to store forever: they might specify any conditions, including time limits or
2after the Charlotte’s Web character whose objective is to stay alive.
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other conditions under which the block is no longer needed. Availability attestations
generalize features found in many existing distributed data systems:
• In BitTorrent, a seeder tells a tracker that it can provide certain files to leechers.
• Many databases inform clients that their transaction has been recorded by a spec-
ified set of replicas.
• In existing blockchains, clients wait for responses from many full nodes, to be
sure their transaction is “available.”
2.4 Integrity Attestations
An ADDS often requires some kind of permission to add a block to its state. For ex-
ample, a blockchain typically requires that some set of servers (“miners”) decide that
a particular block uniquely occupies a given height in the chain. Integrity attestations
determine which blocks belong in which ADDSs. For instance, servers maintaining
a blockchain might issue an integrity attestation stating that a given block belongs on
the chain at a specific height; the server promises not to issue any integrity attestation
indicating that a different block belongs on the chain at that height. Timestamps are
another integrity attestation type: they define an ADDS consisting of all blocks a spe-
cific server claims existed before a specific time. We call servers that issue integrity
attestations Fern servers.3
Fern servers generalize ordering or consensus services. In blockchain terminol-
ogy [51], they correspond to “miners,” which select the blocks belonging on the chain.
2.5 Life of a Block
Figure 2 illustrates one possible process for adding a new block to an ADDS. A client
first mints a block, including data and references to other blocks. To ensure the block
remains available, the client sends it to Wilbur servers, which store it and return avail-
ability attestations, demonstrating the availability of the block.
The client then submits a reference to the block to a collection of Fern servers,
which maintain the integrity of the ADDS. Since Fern servers may not want to per-
manently add a block to their ADDS if that block is going to become unavailable, the
client may also send availability attestations. Fern servers return integrity attestations,
that, in effect, demonstrate the integrity of the statement “this block is in this ADDS.”
The client includes all of these attestations in references to the block, so that when-
ever an observer sees a reference to the block, they know how available it is, and what
ADDSs it belongs to. Over time, more attestations may be issued, so a block can
become more available or join more ADDSs, with greater integrity.
Charlotte is flexible: applications can optimize this process by co-locating services,
forwarding attestations directly between servers, etc.
3after the Charlotte’s Web character who decides which piglets belong.
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New
Block
1. client constructs new block and sends to Wilburs
2. Wilburs return Availability Attestations
3. client sends
Availability Attestations
in request to Ferns
4. Ferns return Integrity Attestations
5. Client completes reference to new block
Figure 2: Life of a block. A client mints a new block, and wants to add it to an ADDS.
The block, as drawn, includes two references to other blocks. The client acquires avail-
ability attestations from Wilbur servers, and integrity attestations from Fern servers.
Then it can create a reference (drawn as a circle) to the block, so anyone observing the
reference knows the block is in the ADDS.
2.6 Observers
We characterize an observer in a distributed system as an entity with a set of assump-
tions concerning the possible ways that the system can fail. Note that failure types
include both Crash and Byzantine [41]. Given a set of assumptions about who can fail
and how, and the desired integrity properties of each ADDS, each observer may choose
to ignore any portions of the blockweb that lack adequate attestations. What remains
is the observer’s view of the ADDS: the set of blocks it believes are available and part
of the state of the ADDS.
Each observer’s view of an ADDS is guaranteed to remain available and to uphold
any integrity properties the observer has chosen so long as the observer’s failure as-
sumptions hold. Further, portions of the blockweb that feature attestations satisfying
two observers are guaranteed to remain in both observers’ views, once both have ob-
served all the relevant blocks. Of course, in practice, servers take time to download
relevant blocks, and in an asynchronous system there is no bound on the time this may
take.
2.7 Example Applications
Blockchains
Charlotte can easily represent blockchains—not only linear chains, but also more in-
tricate sharded or DAG-based structures [45]. Existing blockchain systems already
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Figure 3: A blockchain ADDS with
branches of length < 3. All of the
blocks are present in the blockweb.
The red dotted oval and the blue
solid oval represent two possible al-
ternative states of the ADDS.
effectively provide integrity and availability attestations, phrased as proofs of work,
proofs of stake, etc. Charlotte makes these proofs more explicit, without limiting the
attestation types an application can use. As a result, multiple chains can share a block,
if attestations required for each all refer to the same block. By providing a framework
in which applications can interact, but without prescribing a rigid data structure, Char-
lotte allows far more concurrency than monolithic chains like Ethereum that totally
order all blocks into a single chain [19]. This flexibility is a natural realization of the
database community’s decades-old ideal of imposing a “least ordering” [5].
Distributed Version Control
Charlotte is also a natural framework for applications like Git [68]. Each Git commit is
a block referencing zero or more parent commits. A commit with multiple parents is a
merge, and a commit with no parents is a root. Each Git server stores and makes some
commit blocks available, and can communicate this fact with availability attestations.
A Git server can also maintain branches, which associate a branch name (a string) with
a chain of commits. When a server announces that it is making a new commit the
head of a branch, it issues an integrity attestation stating that the commit is part of the
branch.
Public-Key Infrastructure
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems are almost always ADDSs. Key endorsements
are essentially integrity attestations, defining ADDSs such as the certificate trees used
to secure HTTPS [31] and the web of trust used to secure PGP [9]. Keys and certificates
can be retrieved by hash from dedicated storage servers such as PGP’s keyservers [28,
30, 60], corresponding to Wilbur servers. PKIs such as ClaimChain [38] already attest
to and rely upon data structure properties, e.g., total ordering in chains.
3 Modeling ADDSs Formally
Different, possibly overlapping, portions of the blockweb represent ADDSs of interest
to individual applications. We now explore Charlotte’s unique ability to allow different
ADDSs to interoperate.
As a running example, consider a simple ADDSR representing a single, write-once
slot managed by one server. It can either be empty, or occupied by one unchanging
block.
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3.1 States
A state is a set of blocks, and an ADDS is a set of possible states. For instance, the
Bitcoin blockchain is an ADDS. Every block (other than the origin) in every state
features a proof-of-work. A Bitcoin state can have an arbitrarily long main chain, and
shorter branches. The Bitcoin ADDS consists of all such possible states.
In our single-slot example, each state of R is either empty, or features exactly two
blocks: the block occupying the slot, along with an integrity attestation signed by the
server, referencing that block. We call an integrity attestation in such a state ix, where
x is the other block in the state.
3.2 Observers and Adversaries
Observers represent principals who use the system. An observer receives blocks from
servers and in so doing learns about the current and future states of ADDSs in the
system. Observers may correspond (but are not limited) to servers, clients, or even
people. Formally, an observer is an agent that observes an ordered sequence of blocks
from the blockweb. On an asynchronous network, different observers may see different
blocks in different orders.
Observers define their own failure assumptions, such as who they believe might
crash or lie. These assumptions, combined with evidence, in the form of blocks they
have observed so far, induce an observer’s belief : what they think is true about the
blockweb now and what is (still) possible in the future.
The failure-tolerance properties of any distributed system are relative to assump-
tions about possible failures, including actions taken by adversaries. Charlotte makes
these assumptions explicit for each observer. An observer who makes incorrect as-
sumptions may not observe the properties they expect of some ADDSs. For instance,
if more servers are Byzantine than the observer thought possible, data they believed
would remain available might not. Alternatively, data structures might lose integrity,
such as when two different blocks both appear to occupy the same height on a chain.
We characterize a belief α as a set of possible universes. This set bounds the be-
lieved powers of the adversary: the observer assumes this set includes all possible
universes that might occur under the influence of the adversary. Figure 4 illustrates an
observer holding a belief, and some of the universes in that belief.
Each observer has an initial belief : the belief it holds before it observes any blocks.
For example, an observer who trusts one Fern server to maintain the single-slot ADDS
R does not have any universes in its initial belief in which that server has issued two
integrity attestations for different blocks. This belief encodes the observer’s assumption
that the server’s failure isn’t tolerable. The observer in Figure 4 has such a belief: no
universe features two integrity attestations for R (shown as green squares labeled ix or
iy).
In a traditional failure-tolerant system, an observer usually assumes that no more
than f participants will fail in some specific way (e.g., crash failures or Byzantine
failures). We model such an observer’s initial belief as the set of all universes in which
no more than f participants exhibit failure behaviors (in the form of blocks issued).
3.3 Formalizing Universes
We propose a general model for universes that places few limits on the details or as-
sumptions universes can encode. Our model of a universe U has the following compo-
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Figure 4: An observer holds a belief, which is a set of universes. Here we’ve drawn
some universes as hexagons. Each universe U shown contains blocks in exist(U), with
blocks in avail(U) filled in.
nents, which suffice for all examples in the paper.
1. A set of blocks that can exist, written exist(U). These are the blocks that
either have already been observed or ever can be observed by any observer.
2. A strict partial order Uv on exist(U). Every observer is assumed to observe
blocks in an order consistent with the universal partial order Uv .
3. The set of blocks that are available, written avail(U). These are the blocks
that can be retrieved from some server. Any available block must also exist:
avail(U) ⊆ exist(U).
The set exist(U) constrains the blocks any observer will observe. It does not model
time: an observer’s initial belief contains universes representing all possible futures,
with all blocks that are possible in each.
Since we are modeling asynchronous systems, the model does not explicitly in-
clude the time when blocks are observed, but the ordering Uv constrains the times at
which different observers can observe blocks, implicitly capturing a temporal ordering
on blocks. This ordering is useful for blockchains like Bitcoin, where observers tradi-
tionally do not believe in any universe U unless there is a main chain in which each
block b is ordered (by Uv ) before any equal-height block with which b does not share
an ancestor fewer than security parameter k (usually 6) blocks away. Further, the main
chain must forever outpace any other branch. In Figure 3, this belief (with k = 3)
implies that if a Bitcoin observer believes in a universe U in which both blocks s and c
exist, they must be ordered by Uv . If Bitcoin’s security assumptions are correct, any
two observers must see s and c in the same order.
We make the simplifying assumption in each of our example applications that the
only availability of interest is permanent: we want to characterize whether blocks will
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forever be available. Hence, the set avail(U) increases over time. We leave more
nuanced availability policies to future work.
3.4 Updating Beliefs
As an observer observes blocks being created by Charlotte programs, it updates its
beliefs by whittling down the set of universes it considers possible. For instance, if an
observer with belief α observes a block b, clearly b can exist, so the observer refines its
belief. It creates a new belief α′, filtering out universes in which b is impossible:
α′ = { U b ∈ exist(U) ∧ U ∈ α }
If the observer in Figure 4 were to observe ix, it would update its belief, retaining
only universes U with ix ∈ U . Of the universes shown, only the leftmost three would
remain.
An observer also refines its belief by observation order: If an observer with belief
α observes blocks B in total order <B , then its new belief is:
Possible(α,B,<B) ,
U ∀b
′Uv b. b′ ∈ B ∧ b′ <B b
∧B ⊆ exist(U)
∧U ∈ α

An observer making no assumptions believes in all possible universes. It can only
eliminate universes inconsistent with its observations: those in which blocks it has
observed are impossible, or the order in which it has observed the blocks is impossi-
ble. However, most interesting observers have other assumptions. For example, the
observer in Figure 4 trusts that only one integrity attestation for ADDS R will be is-
sued, so if it observes ix and removes all universes U without ix ∈ exist(U), then no
universes with iy will remain.
As another example, when a Git observer observes a valid integrity attestation for
a block b, it can eliminate all universes with valid integrity attestations for blocks that
are not descendants or ancestors of b.
3.5 Observer Calculations
An observer with belief α knows a set of blocks B are available if they’re made avail-
able in all possible universes:
∀U ∈ α. B ⊆ avail(U)
For example, the observer in Figure 4 trusts availability attestations ax and ay (the
orange squares): it does not believe in any universe where such attestations reference
an unavailable block.
Likewise, an observer with belief α knows a state S of an ADDS D is incontro-
vertible if no conflicting state S′ can exist in any possible universe. Two states conflict
if they cannot be merged to form a valid state: observing one precludes ever observing
the other:
∀U ∈ α, S′ ∈ D. (S ∪ S′ ∈ D) ∨ (S′ 6⊆ exist(U))
For example, the observer in Figure 4 trusts that only one integrity attestation for ADDS
R will be issued. It does not believe in any universes with both ix and iy (shown as
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green squares). Therefore, if it observes ix, it knows the state {ix, x} is incontrovert-
ible: no conflicting state (such as {iy, y}) exists in any universe in its belief.
The state of ADDS D that an observer with belief α sees as available and incontro-
vertible is therefore:
View(α,D) ,⋃{
S
∀U ∈ α, S′ ∈ D. (S′ ⊆ S) ∨ (S′ 6⊆ exist(U))
∧ ∀U ∈ α. S ⊆ avail(U)
∧ S ∈ D
}
We call this the observer’s view of the ADDS: Charlotte’s natural notion of the “current
state.” So long as an observer’s assumptions are correct, new observations can only
cause its view to grow. For example, if the observer in Figure 4 observes both ax and
ix, then it believes the state {ix, x} ∈ R is available and incontrovertible. Its view of
the single-slot ADDS R features x occupying the slot, and so long as its assumptions
are correct, this will never change.
As another example, suppose a blockchain uses a simple agreement algorithm: a
quorum of servers must attest to a block being at a specific height. States consist of
a chain of blocks, each with integrity attestations from a quorum. An observer’s view
will not include any blocks lacking sufficient attestations. The observer assumes that
no two blocks with the same height both get a quorum of attestations, so the chain it
has viewed must be a prefix of the chain in any future view.
One observer can calculate what another observer’s view of an ADDS would be,
if they see the same observations. When two observers communicate, they can share
blocks they’ve observed. Because new observations can only cause a view to grow,
this allows one observer to know (at least part of) another observer’s view when they
communicate. This what we mean when we say views in Charlotte are consistent: two
observers can know what the other views in the same data structure, and so the state of
a data structure can be, in a sense, global.
3.6 Composability
Recall that a state is a set of blocks, and an ADDS is a set of states (§3.1). ADDSs in
Charlotte have two natural notions of composition: union (unionmulti) and intersection (unionmulti).
3.6.1 Union
Intuitively, the union of two ADDSs D and D′ is all the data in either ADDS. As states
are sets of blocks (§3.1), their union is simply the traditional union of sets. Thus, the
union ADDS is composed of unions of states:
D unionmultiD′ , { S ∪ S′ S ∈ D ∧ S′ ∈ D′ }
As a result, given an observer’s failure assumptions, its view of the union of two ADDS
is simply the union of its views of the ADDSs:
Theorem 1.
∀α,D.View(α,D unionmultiD′) = View(α,D) ∪View(α,D′)
Proof. Follows from the definitions of View and unionmulti.
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For example, a Git branch (§2.7) is a ADDS maintained by one server. A Git
repository is the union of many branches with the same root, on the same server. Each
branch ADDS has properties, such as linearity, not necessarily shared by the repository
as a whole. However, the properties of all the ADDSs in a union can be combined to
create properties that hold of the whole. For example, one server makes available all
the blocks in all the branches of a repository. That means that the repository remains
available so long as the server is correct. See §3.5 for more details.
3.6.2 Intersection
Intuitively, the intersection of two ADDSs D and D′ is all the data that is in both D
and D′. As states are sets of blocks (§3.1), their intersection is simply the traditional
intersection of states. Thus, the intersection of ADDSs is composed of the intersections
of states:
D
unionmulti
D′ , { S ∩ S′ S ∈ D ∧ S′ ∈ D′ }
As a result, given an observer’s failure assumptions, its view of the intersection of two
ADDS is simply the intersection of its views of the ADDSs:
Theorem 2.
∀α,D.View(α,D unionmulti D′) = View(α,D) ∩View(α,D′)
Proof. Follows from the definitions of View and
unionmulti
.
For example, consider two blockchains, each serving as a ledger for a different
crypto-currency. The blocks that are part of both chains represent transactions atomi-
cally committed to both ledgers. These are the natural place to put cross-chain trans-
actions: trades involving both crypto-currencies. Thus, the intersection of the two
blockchains is the sequence of cross-chain transactions.
The intersection ADDS shares the properties of all intersected ADDSs. In our
blockchain example, the cross-chain blocks remain totally ordered by the blockweb
so long as either component blockchain remains totally ordered by the blockweb (a
traditional integrity property of blockchains). Furthermore, cross-chain blocks remain
available so long as the blocks of either component blockchain remain available. See
§3.5 for more details.
3.7 Availability Attestation Semantics
Observers use availability attestations to determine which blocks they consider suf-
ficiently available to be in ADDSs they care about (§2.3). Formally, subtypes τ of
availability attestation (which is in turn a subtype of blocks) have values that guarantee
some blocks are available in some universes. To describe the guarantees offered by an
availability attestation, we give a type τ an interpretation JτK that is a belief : that is, a
set of universes in which availability attestations of that type are inviolate (§3.2).
For instance, consider the availability attestation subtype τAliceProvides . Values of
this type are blocks of the form aliceProvides(b) (where b is another block). Intuitively,
each value states that Alice (a Wilbur server) promises to make the specified block b
available forever. Thus, all universes U in τAliceProvides in which aliceProvides(b)
exists also have b available:JτAliceProvidesK ,
{U ∀b. aliceProvides(b) ∈ exist(U) ⇒ b ∈ avail(U)}
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Defining attestations this way makes it easy to define observers’ beliefs based on
whom they trust. For instance, if an observer believes a block will be available only if
it has observed appropriate attestations of both type τ and type σ, we define that belief
α as α = JτK ∩ JσK.
Likewise, a more trusting observer who believes a block is available if it has ob-
served appropriate attestations of type τ or type σ would believe α = JτK∪ JσK. In this
way, we can even build up quorums of attestation types (e.g., (Jτ1K ∩ Jτ2K) ∪ (Jτ2K ∩Jτ3K) ∪ (Jτ1K ∩ Jτ3K)).
There are some restrictions on the semantics of an availability attestation type. At-
testations must be monotonic: adding more attestations never proves weaker state-
ments:
∀U, V,W ∈ JτK. exist(U)∪ exist(V ) ⊆ exist(W ) ⇒
avail(U)∪ avail(V )⊆ avail(W )
3.8 Integrity Attestation Semantics
Integrity attestations (§2.4) are issued by Fern servers (§4.2), and represent proofs guar-
anteeing the non-existence of other integrity attestations, under certain circumstances.
While this definition may seem counter-intuitive, it generalizes the notion of conflict
or exclusivity in ADDSs. For example, in our single-slot ADDS R, all the integrity
attestations found in any state of R are mutually exclusive. Since each (non-empty)
state of R contains an integrity attestation, the existence of one attestation disproves all
conflicting states, which puts the attestation, and the block it references, in the view of
any observer with an appropriate belief.
Formally, a subtype τ of integrity attestation has values that guarantee some other
blocks will not exist in some universes.
Thus, we represent every attestation type τ as a set of universes, essentially a be-
lief (§3.2) in that type. To describe integrity attestations’ guarantees, we have a static
semantics where types are identified with beliefs, sets of universes in which integrity
attestations of that type are inviolate (§3.2).
For example, consider τBobCommits , a subtype of integrity attestation with values
that are blocks of the form bobCommits(b), which intuitively indicates that Bob (a Fern
server) promises never to commit to any block other than b. These integrity attestations
are much like the ones used in our single-slot ADDS R.
Thus, all universesU in which bobCommits(b) ∈ ∃U don’t feature bobCommits(c)
for any c 6= b:
JτBobCommitsK ,{
U ∀b, c. b 6= c ⇒
{
bobCommits(b),
bobCommits(c)
}
6⊆ exist(U)
}
integrity attestation types with these semantics make it easy to define observers’
beliefs based on who they trust. For instance, an observer who believes b is committed
only after receiving an attestation of type τ and an attestation of type σ would believe
α = JτK ∪ JσK. Likewise, a more trusting observer who believes b is committed after
receiving an attestation of either type τ or σ would believe α = JτK ∩ JσK.
It is also possible to combine integrity and availability attestation types to define a
belief. An observer who trusts attestations of type τ to commit blocks, and attestations
of type ρ to ensure their availability would believe: γ = JτK ∩ JρK. In this way, we can
even define quorums of trusted types.
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1 message AnyWithReference {
2 google.protobuf.Any any;
3 Reference typeBlock ;}
4 message Hash {
5 oneof hashalgorithm_oneof
6 { AnyWithReference any;
7 bytes sha3; }}// technically unnecessary
8 message Reference {
9 Hash hash;
10 repeated Hash availabilityAttestations;
11 repeated Reference integrityAttestations ;}
12 message Block {
13 oneof blocktype_oneof
14 { AnyWithReference any;
15 string protobuf; }}
Figure 5: Core Types of Charlotte: this (slightly simplified) proto3 code describes how
blocks, references to blocks, and generic data are safely marshaled and unmarshaled in
Charlotte.
The definition ofPossible(JτK, B,<B) (from §3.2) guarantees integrity attestations
are monotonic: adding more attestations never proves weaker statements:
C ⊆ B ⇒ Possible(τ,B,<B) ⊆ Possible(τ, C,<B)
3.9 Implementation Limitations of Attestations
Since programmers can define their own subtypes of integrity or availability attesta-
tions, nothing prevents them from encoding availability guarantees in an integrity at-
testation, or violating the availability attestation monotonicity requirement (§3.7). Pro-
grammers who violate the system assumptions naturally lose guarantees.
In our implementation, the only operational distinction between an availability at-
testation and an integrity attestation is in the Reference object. When one block ref-
erences another, it can also reference relevant integrity and availability attestations.
However, whereas an included reference to an integrity attestation is itself a Reference
object, an included reference to an availability attestation carries only a Hash. This is
because an integrity attestation might need an availability attestations to describe where
to obtain the integrity attestation. However, the same is not true of an availability at-
testation: it is pointless to send availability attestation b just to describe where to fetch
availability attestation a, since it is just as easy to send availability attestation a in the
first place.
4 Charlotte API
Charlotte is a set of protocols by which clients, Fern servers, and Wilbur servers inter-
act. Different servers can run different implementations of these protocols. Our imple-
mentation of Charlotte (§7) uses gRPC [25], a popular language-independent network
service specification language, based on Protocol Buffers [55]. Hence, we use Protocol
Buffer (protobuf) syntax to describe the Charlotte protocols.
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1 message SendBlocksResponse {
2 string errorMessage ;}
3 service CharlotteNode {
4 rpc SendBlocks(stream Block)
5 returns (stream SendBlocksResponse) {}}
Figure 6: All Charlotte servers implement the CharlotteNode service.
Figure 5 presents the core types used by Charlotte protocols, using Protocol Buffer
syntax.4 Charlotte is built around these core types:
• Block: can contain any protobuf [55] data type, or the block itself can be a
protobuf type definition. Attestation is a subtype of Block. It can contain any
protobuf [55] data type, and the block itself can be a protobuf type definition.
• Hash: represents the hash of a block.
• Reference: is used by one block to reference another; it contains the Hash of
the referenced block, along with zero or more references to attestations (§2.2).
• AnyWithReference: Anyone can add their own subtypes of Block, Hash, or
Attestation, which any server can safely marshal and unmarshal. It contains
a reference to the block where the type description can be found (as proto3 [55]
source code), and marshaled data.5
In practice, we provide some useful example subtypes of Hash (e.g., sha3) and Block
(e.g., Attestation).
In our API, all Charlotte servers must implement the SendBlocks RPC (Figure 6),
which takes in a stream of blocks and can return a stream of responses that may contain
error messages. We define subtypes of attestation for Availability and Integrity, and
show how to construct and observer from quorums of types they trust (§3.7 and §3.8).
4.1 Wilbur
Wilbur servers host blocks, providing availability.
In blockchain terminology [51], Wilbur servers correspond to “full nodes,” which
store blocks on the chain. In more traditional data store terminology, Wilbur servers
are key–value stores for immutable data. The Charlotte framework is intended to be
used for building both kinds of systems.
In our API, Wilbur servers are Charlotte servers that include the RequestAvailabilityAttestation
RPC (Figure 7), which accepts a description of the desired attestation, and returns ei-
ther an error message, or a reference to a relevant availability attestation.
4.2 Fern
Fern servers issue integrity attestations, which define the set of blocks in a given
ADDS. Among other things, integrity attestations can be proofs-of-work, or records
4 For simplicity, our specifications omit the indices of the various fields. The actual source code is also
slightly more complicated for extensibility [2].
5 The proto3 Any type itself features a URL string meant to reference the type definition, but Charlotte
uses a block reference because it is self-verifying.
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1 message AvailabilityPolicy {
2 oneof availabilitypolicytype_oneof {
3 AnyWithReference any; }
4 }
5 message RequestAttestationResponse {
6 string errorMessage;
7 Reference reference;
8 }
9 service Wilbur {
10 rpc RequestAvailabilityAttestation(
11 AvailabilityPolicy)
12 returns (RequestAttestationResponse){}
13 }
Figure 7: Wilbur Service Specification.
1 message IntegrityPolicy {
2 oneof integritypolicytype_oneof
3 { AnyWithReference any; }
4 }
5 service Fern {
6 rpc RequestIntegrityAttestation(
7 IntegrityPolicy)
8 returns (RequestAttestationResponse){}
9 }
Figure 8: Fern Service Specification.
demonstrating some kind of consensus has been reached. One simple type of integrity
attestation, found in our prototype, is a signed pledge not to attest to any other block as
belonging in a specific slot in an ADDS. Fern servers generalize ordering or consensus
services. In blockchain terminology [51], Fern servers correspond to “miners,” which
select the blocks belonging on the chain.
In our API, Fern servers are Charlotte servers that include the RequestIntegrityAttestation
RPC (Figure 8), which accepts a description of the desired attestation, and returns ei-
ther an error message or a reference to a relevant integrity attestation.
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Figure 9: Block a references
block b, and that reference
carries attestations. Block
a also references a type de-
scription block, for unmar-
shaling data in a. In gen-
eral, when sending block a to
a server or client, the sender
should be sure the recipient
has received all the blocks
in the dashed purple rectan-
gle, so the recipient can fully
understand block a and the
properties of its references.
4.3 Practices for Additional Properties
In order to understand a reference object within a block (how available the referenced
block is, and data structures it’s in), an observer reads attestations referenced within
the reference object.6 For example, without the content of the availability attestations,
it’s not clear where to look to retrieve the referenced block. As a rule of thumb, before
one server sends a block to another, it should ensure the recipient has any attestations
or type blocks referenced within that block. This ensures the recipient can, in a sense,
fully understand the blocks they receive. In Figure 9, for instance, when sending block
a, the sender should be sure the recipient has received everything in the dashed rect-
angle. Our example applications follow this practice. It is possible, however, that for
some applications, servers may be certain the recipient doesn’t care about some attes-
tations or type blocks, and therefore might leave those out.
When servers follow this practice, it’s useful for availability attestations to attest
to groups of blocks likely to be requested together. In Figure 9, for instance, and
availability attestation that attests to everything in the dashed rectangle would be more
useful than just attesting to block a. Our example applications’ availability attestations
are generally designed this way.
Availability failures can cause available states of ADDSs to become disconnected
subgraphs (if the blocks that connect them are forgotten). To build an ADDS that
will always remain connected, availability attestations that attest to a block should
also attest to the availability attestations referenced within that block. Furthermore,
whenever a block x references a block y, and block y references block z, if y isn’t
at least as available as z, then x should reference z as well. (Here, “isn’t at least as
available” means that the availability attestations in references to z guarantee z will be
available in some universe where the availability attestations in references to y do not
guarantee y will be available.)
6 We considered making references contain full copies of attestations, but this made blocks large, and
since many blocks may reference the same block (and attestations), blocks were full of redundant informa-
tion.
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1 message WilburQueryInput {
2 oneof wilburquery_oneof {
3 Reference reference = 1;
4 Block fillInTheBlank = 2; }}
5 message WilburQueryResponse {
6 string errorMessage = 1;
7 repeated Block block = 2; }
8
9 service WilburQuery {
10 rpc WilburQuery(WilburQueryInput)
11 returns (WilburQueryResponse) {}}
Figure 10: WilburQuery Specification.
5 Use Cases
In addition to the examples mentioned earlier (§2.7), Charlotte is well-suited to a wide
variety of applications.
5.1 Verifiable Storage
Our Wilbur specification provides a common framework for verifiable storage. Be-
cause ADDS references include hashes, it is always possible to check that data re-
trieved was the data referenced. Furthermore, availability attestations (§3.7) are a nat-
ural framework for proofs of retrievability [6].
5.1.1 Queries
In addition to SendBlocks and RequestAvailabilityAttestation, Wilbur servers
may offer other interfaces. Application designers may wish to implement query sys-
tems for retrieving relevant blocks. We created one such example interface, the WilburQuery
RPC (Figure 10). Given a Hash as input, WilburQuery returns the block with that hash.
If the server does not know of such a block, our example implementation waits until
one arrives.
WilburQuery also provides a kind of fill-in-the-blank match: If sent a block with
some fields missing, WilburQuery returns the all stored blocks that match the input
block in the provided fields. For example, we might query for all blocks with a field
marking them as a member of a certain ADDS.
5.2 Timestamping
Timestamps are a subtype of integrity attestation. We implemented a Signed Time-
stamp type, wherein the signer promises that they have seen specific hashes before a
specific time. Our timestamping Fern servers can use batching: they wait for a specific
(configurable) number of new requests to arrive before issuing a Timestamp block ref-
erencing all of them. In fact, since hash-based references represent a happens-before
relationship [39], timestamps are transitive: if timestamp a references timestamp b, and
b references c, then a effectively timestamps c as well.
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We recommend that batch Timestamp blocks themselves should be submitted to
other Timestamping Fern servers. This allows the tangled web of Timestamp blocks to
very quickly stamp any block with exponentially many timestamps, making them very
high-integrity.
5.3 Conflict-Free Replicated Data Types
Charlotte, and ADDSs in general, work well with CRDTs, especially Operation-Based
Commutative Replicated Data Types (CmRDTs) [59]. CmRDTs are replicated objects
maintained by a group of servers. Whenever a new operation originates at any server,
all known operations on that object on that server are said to happen before it. Then the
operation asynchronously propagates to all other servers. Thus, the set of operations
known to any particular server are only partially ordered. The state of a CmRDT object
is a deterministic function of a set of known operations (and their partial order). For
example, a CmRDT implementation of an insert-only Set might feature the insert
operation, and its state would be the set of all arguments to known insert operations.
In Charlotte, CmRDT operations can naturally be expressed as blocks, with happens-
before relationships expressed as references. Since references are by hash, it is impos-
sible for an adversary to insert a cycle into the graph of operations. The states of a
CmRDT can be formally expressed as all possible sets of operations with all possible
partial orderings.
Aside from whatever credentials one needs to authorize an operation, CmRDTs do
not need integrity attestations. Observers need only consider the graph of known, valid
operation blocks with known ancestry. They may, of course, choose to filter out blocks
they consider insufficiently available. Availability attestations are still useful.
The blockweb as a whole is a CmRDT: Its state is the DAG of all blocks, and every
block is an operation adding itself to the state. Other than the blockweb itself, however,
we have not implemented any interesting CRDTs yet.
5.4 Composition
Charlotte ADDSs are easy to compose (§3.6). At the most basic level, blocks in one
ADDS can reference blocks in another. For instance, a Timestamp server might main-
tain a chain of timestamp blocks, which reference any other blocks people want time-
stamped (Git commits, payments, documents, etc.). A Git-style repository might ref-
erence earlier commits in another repository (either because one is a fork of the other,
or one has merged in code from another) without having to copy all of the data onto
both servers. This would resemble Git’s submodule system [11]. A blockchain could
reference a Git commit as a smart contract, instead of hosting a separate copy of the
code [19]. A single block of data, stored on some highly available servers, could be
referenced from a variety of torrent-style filesharing applications, git-style repositories,
and blockchains, without unnecessary duplication.
At a high level, composability allows us to build high-integrity ADDSs out of low-
integrity ones (§3.6). For instance, the blocks that appear in the intersection of two
chains form a chain that can only fork if both component chains fork. Users may want
to put especially important blocks on many different chains, the way they want many
different witnesses for important legal transactions.
Likewise, we can build low-integrity ADDSs out of higher integrity ones (§3.6). If
a set of blockchains each manage independent tokens, and sometimes share blocks (for
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atomic trades of tokens), then together all the chains form a DAG. If any chain in the
DAG is corrupted, then the supply of that token may not be conserved: the DAG as a
whole is lower integrity than any one chain. This makes it possible to talk about the
“integrity of the marketplace” as distinct from the integrity of any one token.
5.5 Entanglement
Some attestations, such as timestamps §5.2, and proofs of work §6.2.1, implicitly lend
integrity to everything in a block’s ancestry. When many ADDSs reference each other’s
blocks, these recursive attestations can make some forms of fraud very difficult. For
example, if many applications regularly reference past timestamps, and many appli-
cations request timestamps from a variety of servers, it quickly becomes difficult to
falsely claim a block did not happen before a given time, when doing so would involve
hiding evidence embedded in many different applications.
6 Blockchains as ADDSs
Charlotte is an ideal framework for building new blockchains and related applica-
tions (§2.7). In the simplest sense, a blockchain is any path through the blockweb.
However, most existing blockchain applications are considerably more complicated.
Like all ADDSs, a blockchain needs integrity and availability. Here, integrity
means that an observer’s view (§3.2) always features a main chain, in which no two
blocks ever have the same height. Availability means that once an observer observes a
main chain block at a height, that block remains available for download indefinitely.
6.1 Separating Availability and Integrity
With few exceptions [47], existing blockchain systems require that all integrity servers
(e.g., miners, and consensus nodes) store all the blockchain data. This is fundamentally
inefficient. For example, a traditional byzantine consensus system tolerating f failures
needs > 3f participants, while a storage system tolerating f failures needs only > f
participants. If blockchain systems separated storage and consensus duties, they would
be able to store about 3 times as much as they do, with the same failure assumptions.
Charlotte makes it easy to separate availability from integrity. Wilbur servers store
blocks, and provide availability attestations (§4.1). References to those blocks carry
those attestations, proving the block referenced is available. Fern servers need only
issue integrity attestations for each block on the chain, rather than storing it themselves.
For example, if one were to build something like Ethereum in Charlotte, what
Ethereum calls block headers would themselves be integrity attestations, and the Merkle
root in each would instead be a reference (or collection of references) to blocks stored
on Wilbur servers. This makes it natural to search and retrieve block headers and por-
tions of state, without splitting apart blocks, or downloading the whole chain.
6.2 Integrity Mechanisms
Different blockchains have used a variety of mechanisms to maintain the integrity of
the chain [51, 46, 8]. To demonstrate the flexibility of Charlotte, we have implemented
a few example mechanisms in small-scale experiments.
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6.2.1 Nakamoto (Proof-or-Work)
We can represent a Bitcoin/ Ethereum style blockchain as an ADDSD whose states are
trees of proof-of-work blocks. An observer with security parameter k (say, 6) believes
only in universes with a main chain that grows faster than any side chains differing by k
or more blocks. More precisely, if a universe U includes a state S of such a blockchain
D featuring a fork of k or more blocks, one side of the fork must be the main chain, and
all main chain blocks k or higher above the root of the fork must be observed before(
Uv ) all other blocks in S of equal height.
6.2.2 Agreement
Some blockchain applications only require agreement: they lose liveness if two po-
tentially valid blocks are proposed for the same height [57, 42, 63]. For instance, if a
chain represents a single bank account, and potentially valid blocks represent transac-
tions signed by the account holder, then honest account holders should never sign two
transactions unordered by the blockweb.
Agreement servers are simple to implement. When a server attests to a block,
it promises never to attest to any conflicting block. For a given server, an agreement
attestation type τ does not feature any universes where two conflicting blocks both have
an attestation from the server. Observers can construct quorums of trusted servers, as
in §3.8. A block appears in an observer’s view when the observer has observed enough
attestations: committing a conflicting block would require too many parties to break
their promises.
6.2.3 Heterogeneous Consensus (Hetcons)
is our own consensus algorithm based on Leslie Lamport’s Byzantine Paxos [40]. Het-
cons allows each pair of observers (learners [40]) to specify the set of universes (§3.2)
in which they must agree. They define these universes in terms of which Fern servers
(acceptors [40]) are safe (not Byzantine) and live (not crashed) in each. In this way, we
support heterogeneous servers, heterogeneous (or “mixed” [58]) failure models, and
heterogeneous observers. In the symmetric case, when all observers have the same
failure tolerances, Hetcons reduces to regular Byzantine Paxos [40].
For each observer, Hetcons forms quorums of participants whose attestations are
necessary to put a block in the observer’s view. Generally speaking, two observers will
agree so long as all their quorums intersect on a safe participant.
6.3 Blocks on Multiple Chains
In general, nothing prevents a single block from being part of multiple chains. It sim-
ply requires the integrity attestations for each chain. For example, if one blockchain
represents records of events that have happened to a specific vehicle (crashes, repairs,
. . . ), and another represents repairs a specific vendor has performed, it makes sense
to append the record of a specific repair to both chains. The record (a block) could
reference the previous blocks on each chain, and the next blocks on each would in turn
reference it. Each chain’s integrity mechanism would have to attest to the block, and
references to the block could carry both sets of attestations to let readers know it is in
both ADDSs.
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6.3.1 Atomicity
Sometimes, such block appends need atomicity. For example, suppose one blockchain
represents the cryptocurrency RedCoin, and another represents the cryptocurrency Blue-
Coin. ALICE wants to give BOB one RedCoin in exchange for one BlueCoin. This rep-
resents two transactions: one on each chain. Crucially, either both happen, or neither
do. Otherwise, it’s possible that ALICE will give BOB a RedCoin, and get nothing in
return. We want to commit both transactions together, atomically.
6.3.2 Meet
To atomically commit one block to multiple ADDSs, we require a single integrity attes-
tation which represents a commitment to all of them. We call the type of this integrity
attestation the meet (u) of the types of the integrity attestations for the ADDSs in-
volved. If an attestation of type τr commits a block to RedCoin, and an attestation of
type τb commits a block to BlueCoin, then an attestation of type τruτb commits a block
to both. In a sense, τruτb is a subtype of τr or τb, since an attestation of the meet type
can be used wherever an attestation of either supertype can. In our types-as-observers
semantics (§3.7), we define meet as u , ∩. The assumptions made by the meet type
encapsulate all the assumptions made by its component types.
Not all pairs of integrity attestation types have a meet. However, we created meet
types for our Hetcons blockchains. The quorum necessary for an attestation with the
meet type is the union of one quorum from each component type. In other words, to
make an observer decide with an integrity attestation of type τruτb, you need all the
participants it would take to make an attestation of type τr and all the participants it
would take to make an attestation of type τb. With this construction, we can atomically
commit a single block onto multiple Hetcons chains.
6.4 Linearizable Transactions on Objects
It can be useful to model state as a collection of stateful objects, each of which has
some availability and integrity constraints [56]. We can model objects as a chain of
blocks, defined by availability and integrity attestations upholding these constraints.
For instance, if an object must be consistent and available so long as 3 of a specific
4 servers are correct, each block should have “store forever” availability attestations
from 2 servers, and integrity attestations from 3 stating that they’ll never attest to any
other block in that slot.
Each block represents a state change for each of the objects represented by chains of
which the block is a part. In other words, the blocks are atomic (or ACID) transactions
in the database sense [26]. A collection transactions is guaranteed to have a consistent,
serial order so long as the chains maintained for each of the objects they touch are
consistent. For a given observer, the transactions involving objects which that observer
assumes to be linearizable have a serial order so long as that observer’s assumptions are
correct. Furthermore, two correct observers can never see two transactions oppositely
ordered.
This gives programmers a natural model for atomic transactions across object-
chains with different integrity and availability mechanisms, which would be useful
for applications from banking to supply chain tracking. Transactions can involve any
set of objects, so long as their integrity mechanisms have a meet operation for atomic
commitment (§6.3).
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Unaltered 2 Accounts
linearized longest chain 6,953,512 24,129,215time 3.72 years 12.91 years
parallelized longest chain 110,787 244,163time 21.63 days 47.68 days
Figure 11: Theoretical advantages of Charlotte-style parallelization in the Bitcoin pay-
ment network
6.4.1 Banking
We can imagine bank accounts as a linearizable objects, with state changes being de-
posits and withdrawals to and from other bank accounts, signed by appropriate par-
ties. We can model this in Charlotte. Each bank maintains some integrity mecha-
nism (Fern servers) to ensure accounts’ state changes are totally ordered, which pre-
vents double-spending. Likewise, each bank maintains some Availability mechanism
(Wilbur servers), ensuring transactions relevant to their customers’ accounts aren’t for-
gotten. Each transaction is thus a block shared by two chains, and must be committed
atomically onto both chains.
When considering how “trustworthy” the money in an account is, what matters is
the integrity of the ADDS featuring the full ancestry of all transactions in the account.
To ensure the trustworthiness of their accounts, banks may issue their own integrity
attestations for all transactions in the causal past of transactions involving that bank.
This requires checking that ancestry for any inconsistencies with anything to which the
bank has already attested. This ensures any observers trusting the bank’s attestations
have consistent view (§3.2), but cannot guarantee that observers trusting different banks
have the same view.
An “attest to the complete history” approach is analogous to auditing the full fi-
nances of everyone with whom you do business for every transaction. In reality, much
of the time, banks effectively trust each other’s attestations. This allows much faster
transaction times with weaker guarantees.
6.4.2 Supply Chain Tracking
Much like bank accounts, we can imagine each good in a supply chain as a linearizable
object. Transactions may involve decreasing / destroying some goods to increase /
create others. For example, a transaction might feature destroying 10 kg from a case
of grapes to add 9 kg to a vat of juice, and 1 kg to a bin of compost. As with banking,
each good is only as “trustworthy” as the ADDS featuring its complete ancestry, and
audits / attesting to past transactions can increase this trustworthiness.
6.5 Application to Payment Graphs
The Charlotte framework makes it easy to imagine parallelized blockchain-based pay-
ments, with each account as a stateful object, represented by a chain (§6.4.1). As the
Bitcoin payment network is a popular example of blockchain-based finance, we con-
sider the theoretical advantages offered by parallelization in a Charlotte-style approach.
Bitcoin does not keep track of money in terms of accounts. Instead, each transac-
tion divides all its money into a number of outputs, called Unspent Transaction Outputs,
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or UTXOs, each of which specify the conditions under which they can be spent (e.g.,
a signature matching this public key). Each transaction specifies a set of input UTXOs
as well, from which it gets the money, and it provides for each a proof that it is autho-
rized to spend the money (e.g., a digital signature). Each UTXO is completely drained
when it is spent, and cannot be reused. Thus, Bitcoin transactions form a graph, with
transactions as vertices and UTXOs as directed edges [51].
In our Charlotte banking model, each bank account is a chain, so a transfer between
two accounts is simply a block on two chains (§6.4). Therefore, if two sets of financial
transactions don’t interact, they can operate entirely in parallel. The speed of the system
is limited by the speed of its slowest chain. If appending a transaction to its chains takes
constant time, the speed limit is simply the length of the longest chain.
Blocks 1 through 200,000 of Bitcoin contain 6,953,512 transactions. The longest
chain through this graph has length 110,787, so in principle, Charlotte needs time for
only 110,787 rounds of consensus to accommodate the entire payment graph. Although
Bitcoin batches several transactions per block, it required 200,000 rounds of consensus
to do the same, taking a total of 3.72 years. Thus, even with a similarly slow consensus
mechanism, a parallelized Charlotte approach, even with no batching, would require
only 21.63 days. Of course, Charlotte bank accounts can specify Fern servers with
whatever consensus mechanism they like. This could be a much faster system, such as
PBFT [10].
In Bitcoin, it improves anonymity and performance to combine many small trans-
fers of money into big ones, with many inputs and many outputs. In the real financial
system of the USA, however, all monetary transfers are from one account to another.
They are all exactly two-chain transactions. We can simulate this limitation by refac-
toring each transaction as a DAG of transactions with logarithmic depth (Appendix A).
With this construction, a Charlotte banking system might use more than one trans-
action per Bitcoin transaction. The longest chain through this new transaction graph
has length 244,163; so, in principle, Charlotte can process the entire graph in only this
many rounds of consensus. Thus, even with a consensus mechanism as slow as that of
Bitcoin, Charlotte would still require only 47.68 days, a speedup of 28.
7 Implementation
Our full Charlotte spec, with all example types and APIs, is 298 lines of gRPC (mainly
protobuf) [25]. We implemented proof-of-concept servers in 3833 lines of Java [24]
(excluding comments and import statements), with a further 1133 lines of unit tests. We
also wrote 1149 additional lines of Java setting up various experiments. Anonymized
code is available [2].
7.1 Wilbur servers
By default, our example Wilbur servers store all blocks received in memory forever.
They are not meant to be optimal, but they are usable for proof-of-concept applica-
tions. The only type of availability attestation we have implemented is one in which
the Wilbur servers promise to store the block indefinitely. This attestation proves that
the block is available as long as the Wilbur server is functioning correctly.
Our Wilbur servers can be configured with a list of known peers, to whom they will
relay any blocks they receive and any attestations they create. This is easy to override:
servers can be made to relay blocks to any collection of peers.
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1 message PublicKey {
2 message EllipticCurveP256 {
3 bytes byteString ;}
4 oneof keyalgorithm_oneof {
5 AnyWithReference any;
6 EllipticCurveP256 ellipticCurveP256;}}
7 message CryptoId {
8 oneof idtype_oneof {
9 AnyWithReference any;
10 PublicKey publicKey;
11 Hash hash ;}}
12 message Signature {
13 message SHA256WithECDSA {
14 bytes byteString ;}
15 CryptoId cryptoId;
16 oneof signaturealgorithm_oneof {
17 AnyWithReference any;
18 SHA256WithECDSA sha256WithEcdsa ;}}
Figure 12: Signature Specification. We include Any types for extensibility, as well as
default built-in types, like Sha256WithECDSA. Note that the message keyword defines
a type in the local scope.
We also implemented the WilburQuery service of §5.1.1. Our Wilbur servers can do
fill-in-the-blank pattern matching on all implemented block types. The Wilbur Query
service imposes no overhead on other services.
7.2 Version Control
We implemented a simulation of Git [68]. Our servers are not fully-functional version
control software, as they do not implement file-diffs and associated checks, which are
irrelevant for the purpose of demonstrating the Charlotte framework.
The types for our version control ADDS are described in Figure 13. We created
a block subtype, SignedGitCommit, representing a specific state of the files tracked.
Each block features a signature, comment, hash of the state. It can be an initial commit,
in which case it has no parents, but does include bytes representing the full contents of
the files being tracked. Alternatively, it can have some number of parent commits, each
with a reference and a file diff.
A Version Control Fern server tracks the current commit it associates with each
branch (strings). They issue integrity attestations that declare which commits they’ve
put on which branches. A correct Fern server should never issue two such attestations
for the same branch, unless the commits they reference are ordered by the blockweb.
In other words, each new commit on a branch should follow from the earlier commit
on that branch; it cannot be an arbitrary jump to some other files. Our example servers
enforce this invariant [2].
Fern servers can have other reasons to reject a request to put a commit on a branch.
Perhaps they accept only commits signed by certain keys. When a client issues a re-
quest, they can include attestation references. A Fern server can demand that clients
prove a commit is, for instance, stored on certain Wilbur servers before it agrees to put
it on a branch. The Wilbur servers need not even be aware of the Git data types.
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1 message SignedGitSimCommit {
2 message GitSimCommit {
3 message GitSimParents {
4 message GitSimParent {
5 Reference parentCommit;
6 bytes diff;}
7 repeated GitSimParent parent ;}
8 string comment;
9 Hash hash;
10 oneof commit_oneof {
11 bytes initialCommit;
12 GitSimParents parents ;}}
13 GitSimCommit commit;
14 Signature signature ;}
15
16 message Block {
17 oneof blocktype_oneof {
18 AnyWithReference any;
19 string protobuf;
20 SignedGitSimCommit signedGitSimCommit ;}}
21
22 message IntegrityAttestation {
23 message GitSimBranch {
24 google.protobuf.Timestamp timestamp;
25 string branchName;
26 Reference commit ;}
27 message SignedGitSimBranch {
28 GitSimBranch gitSimBranch;
29 Signature signature ;}
30 oneof integrityattestationtype_oneof {
31 AnyWithReference any;
32 SignedGitSimBranch signedGitSimBranch ;}}
Figure 13: Git Simulation integrity attestation Specification. We include Any types for
extensibility, and provide types like SignedGitSimBranch as options. Note that the
message keyword defines a type in the local scope, and that the Signature type is
defined in the full Charlotte spec [2].
Our version control implementation can use the same Wilbur servers as any other
application. In fact, separating out the storage duties of Wilbur from the branch-
maintaining duties of Fern allows our Charlotte-Git system to divide up storage duties
of large repositories, much like git-lfs [22].
7.3 Timestamping
Timestamps are a subtype of integrity attestation. Each Timestamp includes a collec-
tion of references to earlier blocks, the current clock time [33], and a cryptographic
signature.
Our Timestamping Fern servers timestamp any references requested, using the na-
tive OS clock. By default, they issue a timestamp immediately for any request, and do
not need to actually receive the blocks referenced. Because references contain hashes,
the request itself guarantees the block’s existence before that time.
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1 message IntegrityAttestation {
2 message TimestampedReferences {
3 google.protobuf.Timestamp timestamp;
4 repeated Reference block;}
5 message SignedTimestampedReferences {
6 TimestampedReferences timestampedReferences;
7 Signature signature ;}
8 oneof integrityattestationtype_oneof {
9 AnyWithReference any;
10 SignedTimestampedReferences sigTimeRefs ;}}
Figure 14: Timestamping integrity attestation Specification. We include Any types for
extensibility, and provide SignedTimestampedReferences as an option. Note that the
message keyword defines a type in the local scope, and that the Signature type is
defined in the full Charlotte spec [2].
Our Timestamping Fern servers also implement batching. Every 100 (configurable
at startup) timestamps, the Fern server issues a new timestamp, referencing the blocks
it has timestamped since the last batch. Each server then submits its batch timestamp
to other Fern servers (configurable at startup) for timestamping. Since timestamps are
transitive (if a timestamps b, and b references c, then a also timestamps c), blocks are
very quickly timestamped by large numbers of Fern servers. This allows applications
to quickly gather very strong timestamp integrity.
7.4 Blockchains
In principle, any path through the blockweb is a blockchain (§6). We implemented Fern
servers using three very different integrity mechanisms (§6.2). We used some of these
servers to demonstrate the advantages of separating integrity and availability mecha-
nisms (§6.1), and blockchain composition: we put blocks on multiple chains (§6.3).
7.4.1 Agreement
Our Agreement Fern servers keep track of each a blockchain as a root block, and a set
of slots. Each slot has a number representing distance from the root of the chain.
Our Agreement Fern servers use the SignedChainSlot subtype of integrity attes-
tation (Figure 15). It features a cryptographic signature, and references to a chain’s
root, a slot number, and the block in that slot. This serves as a format for both re-
quests and attestations. Each request is simply an IntegrityAttestation with some
fields (like the cryptographic signature) missing. While it is possible to encode this in
the IntegrityPolicy’s any field, we provide the fillInTheBlank option as a conve-
nience.
The Agreement Fern servers are configured with parameters describing which re-
quests they can accept, in terms of requirements on the reference to the proposed block
and its parent. Once a correct Agreement Fern server has attested that a block is in a
slot, it will never attest that a different block is in that slot. For instance, to configure a
blockchain using quorums of 3 Agreement Fern to approve each block, we require that
each request’s parent Reference include 3 appropriate integrity attestations.
27
1 message IntegrityAttestation {
2 message ChainSlot {
3 Reference block;
4 Reference root;
5 uint64 slot;
6 Reference parent ;}
7 message SignedChainSlot {
8 ChainSlot chainSlot;
9 Signature signature ;}
10 oneof integrityattestationtype_oneof {
11 AnyWithReference any;
12 SignedChainSlot signedChainSlot ;}}
13 message IntegrityPolicy {
14 oneof integritypolicytype_oneof
15 { AnyWithReference any;
16 IntegrityAttestation fillInTheBlank ;}}
Figure 15: Agreement integrity attestation Specification. We include Any types for
extensibility, and provide SignedChainSlot as an option. Note that the message key-
word defines a type in the local scope, and that the Signature type is defined in the
full Charlotte spec [2].
Our Agreement Fern servers make it easy to separate integrity and Availability
duties (§6.1). To ensure that a block is available before committing it to the chain,
we require a block Reference to include specific availability attestations from Wilbur
servers.
7.4.2 Nakamoto
Nakamoto, or Proof of Work Consensus is the integrity mechanism securing Bitcoin [51].
We model it formally in §6.2.1. In Bitcoin, miners create proofs of work, which are
stored by full nodes. With the Simplified Payment Verification (SPV)protocol, clients
submit a transaction, and retrieve the block headers (proofs of work and Merkle roots)
of each block in the chain from full nodes [51]. Each client can use these to verify that
1 message IntegrityAttestation {
2 message NakamotoIntegrityInfo {
3 Reference block;
4 Reference parent ;}
5 message NakamotoIntegrity {
6 NakamotoIntegrityInfo info;
7 uint64 nonce;}
8 oneof integrityattestationtype_oneof {
9 AnyWithReference any;
10 NakamotoIntegrity nakamotoIntegrity ;}}
Figure 16: Nakamoto integrity attestation Specification. We include Any types for
extensibility, and provide NakamotoIntegrity as an option. Note that the message
keyword defines a type in the local scope. [2].
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its transaction is in the chain (has integrity).
We implement miners as Fern servers, which produce integrity attestations bearing
proofs of work, taking the place of block headers. Wilbur servers take the place of
full nodes, and store blocks, including integrity attestations. For simplicity, our imple-
mentation assumes one transaction per block, so clients generate blocks, and request
attestations. When a client receives an integrity attestation (Figure 16), it can retrieve
the full chain from Wilbur servers.
With SPV, Clients traditionally try to collect block headers until they see their trans-
actions buried “sufficiently deep” in the chain. For simplicity, our Fern servers delay
responding to the client at all until the client’s block has reached a specified (config-
urable) depth. Regardless, clients can collect integrity attestations from Wilbur servers
until they’re satisfied.
Our implementation of Nakamoto consensus offers a more precise availability guar-
antee than Bitcoin does. Nakamoto Fern servers demand availability attestations with
any blocks submitted, ensuring that before a block is added to the chain, it meets a
(configurable) availability requirement.
7.4.3 Heterogeneous Consensus
We implemented a prototype of Hetcons (§6.2.3) as a Fern service. Integrity attestations
are specific to each observer’s assumptions. We use Charlotte blocks as messages in
the consensus protocol itself, so attestations can reference messages demonstrating that
consensus was achieved.
Hetcons inherits Byzantine Paxos’ minimum latency of 3 message delays. In our
implementation, clients do not participate in the consensus: they merely request an in-
tegrity attestation from a Fern server. Including receiving a request from and sending an
attestation to the client, the process has a minimum latency of 5 messages (Figure 17).
In our implementation, quorums representing trust configurations are encoded as
blocks. Each Hetcons blockchain includes a reference to such a block in its root, en-
suring everyone agrees on the configuration. To append a block to the chain, a client re-
quests an integrity attestation for some observer, specifying proposed block and height.
To propose one block be appended to multiple chains, a client can request an integrity
attestation that is the meet (§6.3) of the integrity attestations needed for both chains.
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The Fern servers then run a round of consensus in which each quorum includes one
quorum of the consensus necessary for each chain.
For the purposes of demonstrating the Charlotte framework, our experiments with
Hetcons are symmetric: all observers want to agree under the same conditions. For
instance, observers might trust 4 Fern servers to maintain a chain, expecting no more
than one of them to be Byzantine.
8 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of Charlotte, we ran instances of each example applica-
tion. Except as specified, experiments were run on a local cluster using virtual ma-
chines with Intel E5-2690 2.9 GHz CPUs, configured as follows:
• Clients: 4 physical cores, 16 GB RAM
• Wilbur servers: 1 physical core, 8 GB RAM
• Fern servers: 1 physical core, 4 GB RAM
To emulate wide area communication, we introduced 100 milliseconds artificial
communication latency between VMs.
8.1 Blockchains
Since blockchains are an obvious application of Charlotte, we evaluated the perfor-
mance, scalability, and compositionality of various blockchain implementations.
8.1.1 Nakamoto
To compare performance of our Nakamoto implementation to Bitcoin’s, we used mul-
tiple (n = 10, 20, 30, 40) Charlotte nodes and measured the mean delay (across 100
consecutive blocks) until a client received an integrity attestation for a block with fixed
security parameter k = 1. All clients and servers had one physical core, and 4 GB
RAM. Figure 18 shows the results of our tests with various difficulty values (expected
number of hashes to mine a block).
When difficulty is low, the delay for an integrity attestation is dominated by the
communication overhead (200 ms). When, more realistically, the difficulty is high,
delay is dominated by the cost of mining. Figure 18 shows that latency increases with
difficulty and decreases with the inverse of the number of Charlotte servers (total com-
putational power). Charlotte indeed scales suitably for blockchain implementations.
In fact, Bitcoin has about 2 × 1011 times the hash power [16], and 1014 times the
difficulty as we had in our experiment, and it achieves an average block latency of
10 min. With compute power scaled appropriately, our implementation would achieve
comparable performance: about 5 minutes per block.
8.1.2 Agreement
To evaluate the bandwidth advantages of separating integrity and availability services,
we built Agreement Chains (§7.4.1) tolerating 1–5 Byzantine failures, both with and
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Figure 18: Mean block delay of Nakamoto on Charlotte, with bars showing standard
error. Difficulty is represented in log2 of the number of hashes expected to mine a new
block.
without Wilbur servers. To tolerate f Byzantine failures, a chain needs 3f + 1 Fern
servers, and, if it relies on Wilbur servers for availability, f + 1 Wilbur servers. We
tested the latency and bandwidth of our chains, with some experiments using 10 byte
blocks, and some using 1 MB blocks. In each experiment, a single client appends 1000
blocks to a chain, with the first 500 excluded from measurements to avoid warm-up
effects. Each experiment ran three times.
In the simple case, without Wilbur servers, all Fern servers receive all blocks. This
resembles the traditional blockchain strategy [51]. The theoretical minimum latency is
2 round trips from the client to the Fern servers, or 200 ms.
We also built chains that separate the Fern servers’ integrity duties from Wilbur
servers’ availability duties. In these chains, Fern servers would not attest to any refer-
ence unless it included f + 1 different Wilbur servers’ availability attestations.
Latency
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Figure 19: Time to commit blocks in Agreement chains with various numbers of
servers. The shaded zones cover the middle percentile of blocks, so the top of the
lightest zone represents the 99th (slowest) percentile, and the bottom represents the 1st
(fastest) percentile. The distribution for the megabyte-block, no-wilbur-server experi-
ment is in Figure 20.
Figure 19 and Figure 20 show the median latency to commit a block for each of
our Agreement chain experiments. Theoretical minimum latency is 4 message sends
(round trip from the client to the Wilbur servers, and then from the client to the Fern
servers), or 400 ms. For chains with small blocks, latency remains close to the 200 ms
and 400 ms minimums. For chains with 1 megabyte blocks, experimental setup has
significant slowdowns, likely due to bandwidth limitations.
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Figure 20: Time to commit blocks in Agreement chains with various numbers of
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shown.
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Figure 21: Total bandwidth used by a client appending 1500 blocks to Agreement-
based chains.
Bandwidth Separating availability and integrity concerns (§6.1) has clear benefits
in terms of bandwidth. Because it sends large blocks to just f + 1 Wilbur servers
instead of 3f + 1 Fern servers, our client uses much less bandwidth in the large-block
experiments with Wilbur servers than without them (Figure 21). In theory, committing
a block with Wilbur servers requires bandwidth for f + 1 blocks, and without Wilbur
servers requires 3f+1 blocks. The overhead inherent in the additional communication
with Wilbur servers and the attestations issued is small compared to the savings.
8.1.3 Heterogeneous Consensus
In order to evaluate the feasibility of consensus-based blockchains, and multi-chain
blocks in Charlotte, we built several chains with Hetcons (§6.2.3), and ran 5 types
of experiments. With our artificial network latency, the theoretical lower bound on
consensus latency is 500 ms, and maximum throughput per chain is 2 blocks/second.
Each experiment recorded the latency clients experience in appending their own blocks
to the chain, as well as system-wide throughput. All Hetcons experiments used single-
core VMs with 8 GB RAM, except as noted.
Single Chain In these experiments, a client appends 2000 successive blocks to one
chain. Mean latency is 527ms for a chain with 4 Fern servers and 538ms for 7 Fern
servers. Since the best possible is 500 ms, these results are promising. Overheads
include cryptographic signatures, verification, and garbage collection.
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Figure 22: Hetcons Multichain and Parallel experiments. In Parallel experiments, each
chain operates independently (and has its own client). In Multichain experiments, one
client tries to append all blocks to all chains. Optimal latency is 500 ms.
Parallel As the darker green lines in Figure 22 show, independent Hetcons chains
have independent performance. In these experiments, we simultaneously ran 1–4 in-
dependent chains, each with 4 or 7 Fern servers. In each experiment, a client appends
2000 successive blocks to one chain. There is no noticeable latency difference between
a single chain and many chains running together. Throughput scales with the number
of chains (and inversely to latency). This scalability is the fundamental advantage of a
blockweb over forcing everything onto one central blockchain.
Multichain shared blocks Shared (joint) blocks facilitate inter-chain interaction (§6.3).
In these experiments, a single client appends 1000 shared blocks to 2–4 chains, each
with 4 or 7 Fern servers. As the yellow lines in Figure 22 show, latency scales roughly
linearly with the number of chains.
Contention In these experiments, all clients simultaneously contend to append 2000
unique blocks to the same chain. We measured the blocks that were actually accepted
into slots 500–1500 of the chain. We used 2–36 clients, and chains with 4 or 7 Fern
servers, configured with 2 GB RAM. Like Byzantized Paxos [40], Hetcons can get
stuck under contention and occasionally requires a dynamic timeout to automatically
trigger a new round. Chain throughput is shown in Figure 23. Our chains, on average,
achieved 1.88 blocks/sec throughput for 4 Fern servers and 1.85 blocks/sec for 7, not far
from the 2 blocks/sec optimum. Throughput does not decrease much with the number
of clients.
Mixed These experiments attempt to simulate a more realistic scenario by including
all 3 types of workload. 2–5 clients contend to append blocks onto either 2 or 7 chains,
each with 4 Fern servers. On each block, a client tries to append a shared block to two
random chains with probability 10% and otherwise tries appending to a random single
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chain. The results are in Figure 24. Throughput can be over 2.0 blocks/sec because
multiple clients can append blocks to different chains in parallel. Mean throughput is
1.8 blocks/sec and 2.7 blocks/sec for 2 and 7 chains respectively, which is expected
because the 2-chain configuration has more contention.
Hetcons scales well horizontally with multiple chains running in parallel. Further-
more, throughput does not decrease much with more clients involved.
This gives us ability to make progress even with lots of clients connecting to the
same chain concurrently. We also notice that, the number of Ferns servers play major
roles for the latency performance. With a small group of Fern servers, Hetcons can
almost reach 500 ms, which is the best we can get. Although the latency increases
linearly with respect to the number of Ferns, for some applications, it is possible to
break down big shared blocks into a set of small shared blocks. For example, in §6.5,
we discuss how to break a k-chain transaction into a log k-depth graph whose nodes
are small two-chain transactions. By following the same strategy, the latency would
be reduced to t× log k, where t is the average latency for completing a 2-chain block.
Since our Hetcons implementation is just a prototype, we believe that with further
efforts in optimization, average latency performance can be improved.
8.2 Timestamping
To evaluate performance, compositionality, and entanglement (§5.5) with a non-blockchain
application, we ran experiments with varying numbers of Timestamping Fern servers (§7.3).
All client and server VMs had 4 GB RAM. For each experiment, a single client re-
quested timestamps for a total of 100,000 blocks. For each block, it requested a time-
stamp from one server, rotating through the Fern servers.
For each 100 timestamps a Fern server issued, it would create a new block referenc-
ing those 100 timestamps, and request that all other Fern servers timestamp this block.
Since timestamps are transitive (if c is a timestamp referencing b, and b references a,
then c also timestamps a), every block was soon timestamped by all Fern servers.
To explore Charlotte’s compositionality, we also composed our (1- or 2-failure-
tolerant) Agreement chains with our Timestamping Fern servers. We saw no statis-
tically significant change in chain performance: the overhead of Timestamping was
unmeasurably small. Each block was timestamped quickly by directly requested Time-
stamping servers, but entanglement (§8.2) was limited by the chain rate.
We also calculated the time it took blocks to accrue different Fern servers’ time-
stamps. As Figure 25 shows, the Fern servers quickly timestamp each request. Blocks
get 1 timestamp very close to the 100 ms network latency minimum. There is a de-
lay between 1 and 2 timestamps because it takes a little while for the Fern servers to
collect 100 timestamps and to create their own block. After that, blocks accrue time-
stamps very quickly, since each Fern Server requests timestamps from all other Fern
servers. These experiments suggest that entanglement (§5.5) can be a fast, efficient,
and compositional way to lend integrity to large ADDSs.
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(very similar).
Not all blocks took exactly the same amount of time to accrue the same number
of timestamps. Figure 26 shows the distribution of times for blocks in the experiment
with 16 Fern Servers. The scale is the same as in Figure 25. In general, each data point
(time for blocks to accrue x timestamps in an experiment with n Fern Servers) was
approximately Poisson distributed.
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9 Related Work
9.1 Address by Hash
Many other distributed systems reference content by hash, forming ADDSs. Most
reference schemes, however, only work within a specific application. For instance, git
uses hashes to reference and request commits stored on a server [68]. Git-lfs can track
and request large files on separate servers with hash-based identifiers [22]. Similarly,
PKI systems (§2.7) reference keys and certificates by hash, and maintain groups of
availability servers [31, 28, 38]. Distributed Hash Tables, such as CFS [14] ultimately
maintain Availability servers, and ensure integrity by referencing data via Hash.
HTML pages can reference resources using the integrity field [70] to specify a
hash, and the src field to specify a server, like an availability attestation without formal
guarantees. Likewise, BitTorrent’s Torrent files [12] and Magnet URIs [13] reference
a file by hashes of various kinds, and can specify “acceptable sources” from which to
download the file. Charlotte’s references aim to be extensible in terms of the hash algo-
rithms used, and generic over all types of data. Uniquely, Charlotte bundles references
to data with references to attestations, which can offer precise formal guarantees.
In concurrent work, Protocol Labs’ IPLD [35] is a multi-protocol format for ad-
dressing arbitrary content by hash. Like Charlotte’s AnyWithReference (§4), Multifor-
mats [50] offers an extensible format for self-describing data including protobufs [55].
Both IPLD and Multiformats are developed closely with IPFS [4], a peer-to-peer file
distribution system. IPLD references do not include attestation references the way
Charlotte references do, but future work could fruitfully combine these technologies
with Charlotte’s reference and block encoding formats.
9.2 BlockDAGs
Other projects have explored DAGs of blocks in a blockchain context. Many, such as
Iota [53], Nano (also known as RaiBlocks) [42], Avalanche [57], Spectre [63], Phan-
tom, and Ghostdag [64] are tailored to cryptocurrency. Each defines its own currency,
and they do not compose.
Some projects, such as æternity [27], alephium [69], Qubic [34], and Plasma [52]
enable general-purpose computation on a BlockDAG by way of smart contracts. How-
ever, they ultimately rely on a single global consensus mechanism for the integrity of
every application.
Sharded blockchains, including Omniledger [37], Elastico [44], RapidChain [72],
RSCoin [15], and Ethereum 2.0 [7] are a form of BlockDAG. Most still require that all
applications have essentially the same trust assumptions.
Other sharded blockchain projects, such as Aion [66], Cosmos [20], and Polka-
dot [71], envision heterogeneous chains with inter-chain communication. Polkadot
features a single Relay Chain trusted by all parachains (parallelizable chains), although
it does allow parachains to proxy for outside entities, including other blockchains. Per-
haps most similarly to our multi-chain transactions (§6.3), Aion can use Bridges, con-
sensus mechanisms trusted by multiple chains, to commit a transaction to each.
All of these blockchain projects operate at a higher level of abstraction than Char-
lotte. Charlotte is a generic format for communicating blocks, with a novel attestation-
based model for specifying availability and integrity properties. However, we believe
any of these projects could benefit from building their implementations within the Char-
lotte framework. For example, where Cosmos’ Inter-Blockchain Communication [20]
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and Aion’s Transwarp Conduits [29] require that one chain be able to read and validate
transaction commits from another, we present a unified framework for the data they
must request and interpret: integrity attestations.
9.3 Availability attestations
Although storage services are widely available [1, 23, 49], availability attestations (§3.7)
make Wilbur servers unique. The only type of availability attestation we have imple-
mented is a simple promise to store a block indefinitely. However, there is a great deal
of work on reliable storage [17, 21] and proofs of retrievability [36, 6, 61] that could be
used to make a variety of availability attestation subtypes that provide more availability
with less trust.
9.4 Integrity attestations
Integrity attestations abstract over a variety of mechanisms lending integrity to data
provenance and ADDS properties. In some ways, attestations resemble the labels of
distributed information flow control systems [74, 43], and implement a kind of endorse-
ment [73] as additional attestations are minted for the same block. In other ways, in-
tegrity attestations generalize ordering services for traditional distributed systems [32]
or blockchains [65]. These services maintain a specific property of a ADDS (order-
ing), much like our blockchain integrity attestations. However, integrity attestations
generalize over many possible properties: timestamps, provenance, etc.
Future integrity attestation subtypes might take advantage of technologies like au-
thentication logic proofs and artifacts representing assurances of data provenance [3,
62].
10 Conclusion
Charlotte offers a decentralized framework for composable Authenticated Distributed
Data Structures with well-defined availability and integrity properties. Together, these
structures form the blockweb, a novel generalization of blockchains. Charlotte ad-
dresses many of the shortcomings of existing ADDSs by enabling parallelism and com-
posability. Charlotte is flexible enough to enable applications patterned after any ex-
isting ADDS while offering rigorous guarantees through attestations that can be given
precise semantics.
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Figure 27: Converting 4 inputs and 4 outputs to a graph of 2-account transactions.
A Bitcoin Transactions in Two Accounts or Fewer
In Bitcoin, it is advantageous to combine many small transfers of money into big ones,
with many inputs and many outputs. This improves anonymity and performance. In the
real financial system of the USA, however, all monetary transfers are from one account
to another. They are all exactly two chain transactions.
We can simulate this limitation by refactoring each Bitcoin UTXO as 2 UTXOs,
and each Bitcoin transaction as a DAG of transactions with depth:
dlog2(max(number of inputs, number of outputs))e
To do this, we create
n , 2d
chains, each of which is
d , dlog2(max(number of inputs, number of outputs))e
long. We call these chains C0 through Cn. Original input UTXO i corresponds to
both inputs to the first transaction of chain i. Original output UTXO j corresponds to
one output of each of the last transactions from chains j and
(
j + 2d−1
)
mod n. For
0 ≤ k < (d− 1), the outputs of the kth transaction in chain i, called Cik, go to Cik+1,
and:
C
(i+2j)mod n
k+1
The outputs ofCid go to the UTXOs corresponding with output i, and output
(
i+ 2d−1
)
mod n.
Each transaction divides its output values proportionately to the sums of the final output
values reachable from each of the transaction’s outputs. Figure 27 is an example trans-
formation from a 4-input, 4-output transaction to a DAG of depth 2 using all 2-input,
2-output transactions.
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